AGRÉGATION EXTERNE D’ANGLAIS

ÉPREUVE HORS PROGRAMME

Première partie (en anglais, durée maximale : 40 minutes)
Vous procéderez à l’étude et à la mise en relation argumentée des trois documents du dossier proposé (A, B, C non hiérarchisés). Votre présentation ne dépassera pas 20 minutes et sera suivie d’un entretien de 20 minutes maximum.

Deuxième partie (en français, durée maximale : 5 minutes)
À l’issue de l’entretien de première partie, et à l’invitation du jury, vous vous appuierez sur l’un des trois documents du dossier pour proposer un projet d’exploitation pédagogique dans une situation d’enseignement que vous aurez préalablement définie. Cette partie ne donnera lieu à aucun échange avec le jury.

The only thing that moved upon the vast semicircle of the beach was one small black spot. As it came nearer to the ribs and spine of the stranded pilchard boat, it became apparent from a certain tenuity in its blackness that this spot possessed four legs; and moment by moment it became more unmistakable that it was composed of the persons of two young men. Even thus in outline against the sand there was an unmistakable vitality in them; an indescribable vigour in the approach and withdrawal of the bodies, slight though it was, which proclaimed some violent argument issuing from the tiny mouths of the little round heads. This was corroborated on closer view by the repeated lunging of a walking-stick on the right-hand side. ‘You mean to tell me... You actually believe...’ thus the walking-stick on the right-hand side next the waves seemed to be asserting as it cut long straight stripes on the sand.

‘Politics be damned!’ issued clearly from the body on the left-hand side, and, as these words were uttered, the mouths, noses, chins, little moustaches, tweed caps, rough boots, shooting coats, and check stockings of the two speakers became clearer and clearer; the smoke of their pipes went up into the air; nothing was so solid, so living, so hard, red, hirsute and virile as these two bodies for miles and miles of sea and sandhill.

They flung themselves down by the six ribs and spine of the black pilchard boat. You know how the body seems to shake itself free from an argument, and to apologize for a mood of exaltation; flinging itself down and expressing in the looseness of its attitude a readiness to take up with something new—whatever it may be that comes next to hand. So Charles, whose stick had been slashing the beach for half a mile or so, began skimming flat pieces of slate over the water; and John, who had exclaimed ‘Politics be damned!’ began burrowing his fingers down, down, into the sand. As his hand went further and further beyond the wrist, so that he had to hitch his sleeve a little higher, his eyes lost their intensity, or rather the background of thought and experience which gives an inscrutable depth to the eyes of grown people disappeared, leaving only the clear transparent surface, expressing nothing but wonder, which the eyes of young children display. No doubt the act of burrowing in the sand had something to do with it. He remembered that, after digging for a little, the water oozes round your finger-tips; the hole then becomes a moat; a well; a spring; a secret channel to the sea. As he was choosing which of these things to make it, still working his fingers in the water, they curled round something hard—a full drop of solid matter—and gradually dislodged a large irregular lump, and brought it to the surface. When the sand coating was wiped off, a green tint appeared. It was
a lump of glass, so thick as to be almost opaque; the smoothing of the sea had
completely worn off any edge or shape, so that it was impossible to say whether
it had been bottle, tumbler or window-pane; it was nothing but glass; it was
almost a precious stone. You had only to enclose it in a rim of gold, or pierce it
with a wire, and it became a jewel; part of a necklace, or a dull, green light upon
a finger. Perhaps after all it was really a gem; something worn by a dark Princess
trailing her finger in the water as she sat in the stern of the boat and listened to
the slaves singing as they rowed her across the Bay. Or the oak sides of a sunk
Elizabethan treasure-chest had split apart, and, rolled over and over, over and
over, its emeralds had come at last to shore. John turned it in his hands; he held
it to the light; he held it so that its irregular mass blotted out the body and
extended right arm of his friend. The green thinned and thickened slightly as it
was held against the sky or against the body. It pleased him; it puzzled him; it
was so hard, so concentrated, so definite an object compared with the vague sea
and the hazy shore.

Now a sigh disturbed him—profound, final, making him aware that his friend
Charles had thrown all the flat stones within reach, or had come to the
conclusion that it was not worth while to throw them. They ate their sandwiches
side by side. When they had done, and were shaking themselves and rising to
their feet, John took the lump of glass and looked at it in silence. Charles looked
at it too. But he saw immediately that it was not flat, and filling his pipe he said
with the energy that dismisses a foolish strain of thought,

‘To return to what I was saying—’
**DOCUMENT B**


HYLAS. There is not that single thing in the world, whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

PHILONOUS. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

HYLAS. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid: but this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark, as to that.

PHILONOUS. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

HYLAS. Know? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it. All you know, is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the world. They have none of them anything in themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them as they are in their own nature.

PHILONOUS. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

HYLAS. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have no absolute existence in Nature. And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

PHILONOUS. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

HYLAS. Even so.

PHILONOUS. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is,

* Philonous = lover of mind; hyle = matter (Greek)
but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life as comfortably and conveniently, as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.

HYLAS. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that, make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers know better things.

PHILONOUS. You mean, they know that they know nothing.

HYLAS. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

PHILONOUS. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

HYLAS. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on it, I must agreeably to my former concessions farther declare, that it is impossible any real corporeal thing should exist in Nature.

PHILONOUS. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all these extravagancies by the belief of *material substance*? This makes you dream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on it, I must agreeably to my former concessions farther declare, that it is impossible any real corporeal thing should exist in Nature.

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HYLAS. I agree with you. *Material substance* was no more than an hypothesis, and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in
defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

PHILONOUS. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion, that the real things are those very things I see and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I know and finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings.
DOCUMENT C

Joseph Cornell, *Untitled (Sand Fountain)*, 1954. Wood box construction, glass, painted wood balls, plastic, 27.9 x 20.3 x 11.4 cm, private collection.